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1. Introduction 
 
Subsistence farms in developing countries face a difficult environment characterized by a 
high degree of risk, credit constraints, a lack of financial markets, high input costs, and time-
inconsistent preferences (Duflo 2006). These factors shape smallholder farming practices and 
performance, as well as production and investment decisions (Stiglitz, Emran and Morshed 2006; 
Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar 2010; Karlan et al. 2014). Provision of agricultural credit at a 
subsidized interest rate mulla be an effective tool for enhancing the production of rural farms. 
Relaxing the credit constraint for farming enterprises could lead to greater adoption of modern 
inputs and improved ability to turn inputs into outputs, both of which boost productivity. 
Productivity and efficiency underscore the organizational capacity of subsistence farmers to deal 
with external shocks, and have far-reaching implications in terms of ensuring their sustainable 
livelihood (World Bank 2004). Therefore, understanding the relationship between credit 
constraints and farm productivity and efficiency has crucial policy implications. If the relaxation 
of credit constraints produces efficiency improvements, policymakers need to account for these 
additional benefits of credit programs. 
In this study, we examine how access to credit influences farmer productivity, and 
whether the effects on output come from changes in technology and/or from increased 
efficiency.1 We do so by using survey data from a field experiment2 that exploits the random 
assignment of credit services to agricultural enterprises by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC)3 and employing a stochastic production frontier model.4 First, we examine 
the impact of credit access on the productivity of rice-producing farms.5 Then, we disentangle 
the overall productivity effect into technological change and changes in efficiency. In addition to 
identifying the impacts of credit access on productivity, technological change, and technical 
efficiency, we examine how the change in efficiency varies in relation to several demographic 
 
1 We define productivity as yield per unit of land (kilogram of rice per decimal of land). A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in 
India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimal=1 hectare. 
2 As per the taxonomy presented by Harrison and List (2004). 
3 The largest NGO in Bangladesh.  
4 The conventional production function approach does not allow us to separate technological change (frontier shift) and efficiency improvements 
from the overall productivity effect. We use the stochastic frontier model because it allows us to decompose these two effects, we use this approach 
as a tool to answer our research question. 
5 Hossain et al. (2018), Hossain et al. (2016), and Malek et al. (2015) examine the impact of the BCUP program on asset holdings, aggregate 
welfare, and wage employment.  
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and farm characteristics. 
Previous empirical studies have found that provision of microcredit to farmers can boost 
their yield and productivity (McKernan 2002; Chirkos 2014; Hussain and Thapa 2012; Rahman, 
Hussain and Taqi 2014), as well as leading to higher income-generating activities in developing 
countries (Karlan and Zinman 2009; Kondo et al. 2008; Montgomery and Weiss 2011).6,7 For 
example, using data from a survey carried out in rural Bangladeshi villages, McKernan (2002) 
estimated the impact of household participation in three microcredit programs (BRAC, BRDB’s 
RD-12 program, and Grameen Bank). Measuring the total and noncredit effects of microcredit 
program participation on productivity, McKernan (2002) found a significant positive effect of 
participation in the credit program on productivity among self-employed enterprises. 
In addition to the empirical literature examining the link between credit expansion and 
productivity, other studies have examined whether credit influences farm efficiency. 
Conceptually, relaxing credit constraints has an ambiguous effect on the technical efficiency of 
farming enterprises. On the one hand, less credit-constrained farms can procure more inputs and 
more easily cover operating expenses in the short run (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986; 
Blanchard et al. 2006), enabling them to make better investments in the long run (Hadley et al. 
2001; Blanchard et al. 2006; Davidova and Latruffe 2007; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008; Karlan 
et al. 2014).8 Credit can also mitigate consumption risk and enable greater adoption of modern 
inputs by small, risk-averse farms (Liu and Zhuang 2000; Easwaran and Kotwal 1989). On the 
other hand, if farmers face other constraints or market imperfections (Jack 2013), such as lack of 
access to insurance, lack of markets, or high input costs, then access to credit will not translate in 
to higher productivity and technical efficiency.  
Recent empirical studies have attempted to measure inefficiency in agricultural 
enterprises and examine the factors underlying this inefficiency (Anang, Backman and Sipiläinen 
 
6 Numerous other experimental field studies, documented in Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015), Banerjee (2013), and Roodman (2014), have 
examined how the availability of microcredit affects other important outcomes, such as business size and profits (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 
2015), income composition (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 2015), stock of household durables (Attanasio et al. 2015), occupational choice, 
business scale, and risk management (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman 2015), female decision-making power (Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman 2015), 
and happiness and trust (Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman 2015).  
7 De Janvry, Sadoulet, and Suri (2017) reviewed all of the recent experimental field studies on agricultural inputs in developing countries. We 
focus on credit as an input and its impact on productivity and technical efficiency. The impact of other production inputs on productivity has also 
been examined in relation to inputs such as credit (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008, McKenzie and Woodruff 2008), capital (Karlan, 
Knight and Udry 2015), labor (Shearer 2004), information (Beaman and Magruder 2012), monitoring (Nagin et al. 2002), and managerial 
practices (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010, Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014). 
8 Credit has been shown to affect the risk-taking behavior of producers (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger 2008; Eswaran and Kotwal 1990), thereby 
affecting technology choices and adoption by farmers. The timing of the investment decision can also play an important role in one’s risk preferences 
(Nikolov 2018).  
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2016; Islam, Sumelius and Bäckman 2012; Bravo-Ureta et al. 2007). However, the findings of 
these studies are largely based on observational designs, and the determinant factors are not 
based on any exogenous changes. Furthermore, many studies have produced conflicting results. 
For instance, using parametric efficiency analysis, Taylor et al. (1986) and Brummer (2000) 
found a negative relationship between relaxed credit constraints and the efficiency of farmers. 
However, other studies focused on the Philippines, West Bengal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh 
found relaxed credit constraints to be an important and beneficial determinant of farm efficiency 
(Martey, Wiredu and Etwire 2015; Islam, Sipilainen and Sumelius 2011). 
Building on existing studies that have examined how credit influences productivity, we 
investigate how credit expansion, as a result of a subsidized interest rate,9 influences productivity 
gains via two distinct channels: technical change (frontier shift) and change in technical 
efficiency. Using a stochastic frontier approach, we separate the frontier shift effect from the 
efficiency effect. 
We find that relaxing the credit constraint has a significant positive impact on rice 
production, both in relation to frontier shift and technical efficiency. We find a positive impact 
from access to credit on total rice output, specifically high-yielding variety (HYV) rice and 
hybrid rice, but no impact on traditional rice varieties. We find that, relative to the baseline, 
credit access increases overall productivity by, on average, approximately 14 percent, with the 
greatest impact on modern hybrid rice growing farms. After decomposing the overall output 
effect into frontier shift and efficiency change effects, we find that around 11 percent of the 
overall productivity gain comes from technological change, or frontier shift. In terms of technical 
efficiency, small-scale farms with access to subsidized credit are, on average, 3 percent more 
efficient than farms10 without credit access (which, relative to the average baseline rice yield of 
18 kilograms per decimal, implies approximately half a kilogram less lost output as a result of 
inefficiency). This positive effect is even more pronounced among producers of hybrid rice 
varieties, who exhibit an efficiency gain of, on average, 9 percent. Moreover, we find different 
impacts among marginal and tenant farm households.11 Our results show that among the farms 
with credit access, enterprises with less than 50 decimals under cultivation are, on average, 3 
 
9 Although we rely on an exogenous change in the price of borrowing as a result of the fact that the treatment group obtains access at a subsidized 
rate, other studies have examined exogenous changes in other aspects of microcredit programs such as microcredit access (Banerjee et al. 2015; 
Crepon et al. 2015), loan maturity (Karlan and Zinman 2008), and loan eligibility (Karlan and Zinman 2009). 
10 In this study, we use the term “farm households” interchangeably with “poor rice farmers”. 
11 Tenant farm households are farms that cultivate other people’s land, either through sharecropping or renting, or both.  
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percent less efficient than larger farms. We also find strong evidence of a positive effect of credit 
access (at the 95th percentile level) on efficiency for tenant farm households compared with pure 
owner farms. 
Our findings highlight the likely mechanisms explaining the positive impacts of 
microcredit access on productivity and efficiency. In the absence of insurance and credit 
markets, credit-constrained households are more likely to continue their conventional farming 
practices. Enhanced access to credit enables farm households to adopt more productive crop 
varieties and utilize complementary production inputs in a more timely manner. Credit can also 
boost farms’ potential to manage and allocate their resources more effectively, which also results 
in increased output. We find that the adoption of modern hybrid rice varieties is significantly 
higher, on average, among households that have credit access. Furthermore, households with 
access to credit procure significantly more pesticides, which are essential in ensuring stable 
yields of hybrid rice varieties.12 We find larger productivity gains among producers of modern 
rice varieties and almost no gains among producers of traditional rice varieties. One explanation 
for this difference might be that modern rice varieties offer greater potential yields, but also 
require more complementary inputs, and the timely application of those inputs, which farmers 
find easier to manage when they have access to credit. Although our study is limited to the 
impact of credit rather than the combined impact of credit and extension services,13 our analysis 
shows that farmers with access to credit are more likely to be familiar with and able to discuss 
crop choices, input choices, and farm practices with agricultural extension service officers and 
providers than those without access (see Table A5 in the Appendix).14 
This study makes three important contributions to the empirical literature. First, relative 
to previous empirical studies, we identify more credible, causal impacts of credit access on the 
productivity and efficiency of small farm enterprises in a low-income country context by 
exploiting the experimental design of the BCUP program, augmenting our analysis with a 
stochastic frontier approach. Specifically, the random assignment of microcredit access ensures 
that the technologies of the two groups (treatment and control), which we use in the stochastic 
frontier analysis, remain fixed at the baseline. Second, our study complements previous field 
 
12 The timely and repeated use of pesticides is very important in ensuring higher returns from modern hybrid rice varieties.  
13 The BCUP program included complementary extension services in the initial years. However, BRAC ceased to provide extension services in 
2012 because of high attrition rates and high recovery costs (Hossain et al. 2018). 
14 For simplicity, we have not modeled risk in this study. 
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experiments (Banerjee et al. 2015). Although previous studies have examined the impact on 
productivity (McKernan 2002; Chirkos 2014; Hussain and Thapa 2012; Rahman, Hussain and 
Taqi 2014), we contribute to the empirical literature by examining the specific source of the 
overall productivity gain, that is, whether it comes from a frontier shift or from improved 
efficiency. Third, recent economic studies have found that various forms of scarcity can 
influence optimizing behavior among the very poor (Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir 2012; Shah, 
Shafir and Mullanathan 2015). Adding to this strand of the literature, we examine how credit can 
influence efficiency among the poor. Because the poor already operate and make decisions under 
conditions of significant scarcity of resources, shedding light on how to improve the efficiency 
of their farming enterprises has important welfare implications.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the program design, data 
sources, and summary statistics. Section 3 describes the conceptual framework and the channels 
through which credit influences the two study outcomes. The empirical strategy is described in 
Section 4. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the 
findings. 
2. Project Background  
 
2.1 The BCUP Credit Program  
 
In 2009, BRAC introduced a Tenant Farmers Development Project known as Borga 
Chashi Unnayan Prakalpa (BCUP). The project was initiated with Tk. 5,000 million (USD 70 
million) as a revolving loan from Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, at a monthly 
interest rate of 5 percent, the rate at which commercial banks can borrow funds from the central 
bank. Funding was initially offered for three years, with the aim of providing credit to 300,000 
farmers.  
The main objective of the BCUP program was to reduce the dependence of tenant 
farmers on high-cost informal markets for financing their working capital needs. Tenant farmers 
are typically bypassed by conventional microfinance institutions and the formal banking sector, 
resulting in a lack of working capital, and thus restricted access to inputs and lower productivity 
(Hossain and Bayes 2009). By reducing the credit constraints faced by these farmers, the BCUP 
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program aimed to significantly improve farm productivity, and thus the livelihoods of rural 
small-scale farm households in Bangladesh.  
BCUP provides a customized credit service based on the proprietary composition of the 
recipient farms, that is, pure tenant, mixed tenant, or pure owner. Loans are provided at a 
reduced fixed interest rate of 10 percent per year (see Figure 3). If a farmer cannot repay an 
installment by the due date, he/she must pay additional interest with the remaining installments. 
The effective rate of interest is 19 percent on a declining balance basis, which is still lower than 
the 27 percent charged by other microfinancing programs in Bangladesh.15 The loan amount 
ranges from a minimum of 63 USD to a maximum of 1,500 USD (Tk. 5,000–120,000), the 
duration is 6–10 months, the grace period is one month, and repayment is by monthly 
installment. BCUP targeted all 484 upazilas (sub-districts) of Bangladesh in successive phases. 
According to BRAC Microfinance administrative data, the BCUP program disbursed 8 billion 
USD in loans to about 700,000 farmers between its launch in 2009 and June 2018. 
Households are selected for loan disbursement based on several stages of verification. 
The first stage entails the initial selection of members. Members are selected by assessing each 
household against the BCUP eligibility criteria and familiarizing farmers with the BCUP 
program and its terms and conditions.16 In the second stage, a farmer is assigned to the nearest 
village organization (VO) given that he/she agrees to the terms and conditions of the BCUP. 
Stage three entails the collection of more detailed information about members. In the fourth and 
final stage, the list of members is finalized after verification by a branch manager, who 
determines the eligibility of the members who were initially selected.  
After this selection process, new members are formally admitted and attend an 
orientation meeting. An important feature of the BCUP program is the formation of the village 
organization (VO) and its use as a platform for service delivery. A total of four to eight five-
member teams, that is, 20 to 40 farmers, consists a VO. The VO members meets once a month at 
a set time on a fixed day, and the BCUP program organizer attends the VO meeting to discuss 
loan proposals and collect repayment installments, dues, and savings deposits.  
 
15As per the rules of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) of Bangladesh Bank, NGOs can charge up to a maximum of 27 per cent 
interest on declining balances through their microfinance operations. 
16 The eligibility criteria for the BCUP program were: 1) The farmer has a National ID card; 2) The age of the farmer is between 18 and 60 years; 
3) The education level of the farmer is no higher than SSC; 4) The farmer must have been a permanent resident of the area for at least three years; 
5) The farmer has at least three years of prior experience in farming; 6) The land holding must be between 33 decimals and 200 decimals; 7) The 
farmer cannot be an MFI (Micro Finance Institution) member; and 8) The farmer must be willing to accept credit from BCUP. 
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The BCUP program included complementary extension services in the initial years when 
BRAC’s agricultural development officers attended the monthly VO meetings to provide 
information and advice on modern cultivation systems and farm management. However, because 
of high attrition rates and high recovery costs, BRAC ceased to provide extension services in 
2012. Therefore, this study is limited to the impact of credit access, rather than the combined 
impact of credit access and extension services. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the 
baseline household composition of program participants in relation to the various inputs used and 
output in the form of rice production. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2 Experimental Design and Baseline Survey   
 
The BCUP program was established under a clustered randomized control trial design. 
Initially, the program identified 40 potential sub-district/branch17 offices for program scale-up in 
2012. The research team randomly selected 20 treatment branch offices for intervention, while 
the other 20 branches were designated as control branch offices. Then, we randomly selected six 
of the 10–12 villages within an eight-kilometer radius of each BCUP branch office. The eight-
kilometer radius was chosen because BRAC branch offices usually operate within this area for 
administrative purposes. The sub-district/branch is the first unit of randomization, followed by 
the village/community. As each branch is located in a different sub-district, and each sub-district 
is a separate government administrative unit with a well-known geographical boundary, 
contamination between the treatment and control BCUP branches is unlikely. Figure 2 provides a 
spatial overview of the treatment and control areas. It can be seen that most of the treatment 
branches were sufficiently distant from control branches.18 
We conducted a household-level census in all 240 villages to identify eligible 
households. The census covered a total of 61,322 households, of which 7,563 households 
 
17 The sub-district (upzila) is an administrative unit in Bangladesh. There are 491 sub-districts in Bangladesh. 
18 A few branches in the southern region were exceptions. For the southern region branches, GIS mapping (see Figure A1 in the Appendix) was 
undertaken and the results were forwarded to the program administrators so that they could continue to expand the number of treatment 
intervention branches within the appropriate areas while avoiding incursions into the control areas. Because the BCUP program administrators 
were aware of the status of each branch in the study, it was unlikely that the program officers would disburse loans in a control branch (Malek et 
al 2015). 
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fulfilled the program eligibility criteria19 and were willing to accept agricultural credit.20 Then, 
we randomly selected 4,301 of these households for detailed data collection, 2,155 households 
from treatment villages and 2,146 households from control villages.21 The baseline survey on 
various inputs and rice output was conducted in 2012,22 and a short-term follow-up survey was 
carried out in 2014. Figure 1 shows the experimental study design. Households in the treatment 
units were provided with access to credit of up to 120,000 Tk. (≈1500 USD). Figure 3 shows the 
features of the program.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] [Figure 2 about here] [Figure 3 about here] 
 
With random assignment of study subjects to one of the two groups, the baseline census 
characteristics should be, on average, the same across the treatment and control groups, apart 
from sampling variations. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 show the baseline means of the variables 
for the control and treatment groups, respectively.23 We tested the equality of the means by 
random assignment of credit access, and column 3 in Table 2 presents the associated p-values. 
We found that almost all of the 26 differences between the control and treatment groups had a p-
value of less than 0.10, except for female-headed households, which suggests that the baseline 
mean characteristics of the two groups are statistically similar.24 We also performed a joint test 
of orthogonality to test for baseline balance. The result of the joint significance test is shown in 
the final row of Table 2. These findings are consistent with the successful implementation of 
random assignment of subjects.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We also checked whether households in the treatment group dropped out of the study at a 
different rate to those in the control group (see Table 3). A substantial difference in attrition rates 
 
19 Described in Section 2.1.  
20 Willingness to accept credit is measured by a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer in response to the question of whether a respondent is inclined to accept 
credit from the BCUP program. 
21 We adopted a simple random sampling method to select households from each village. The survey covered 4,301 households, of which 2,155 
were in treatment areas and 2,146 were in control areas.  
22 Following the baseline survey, we forwarded the list of treatment branches to the BRAC-BCUP administrators, whereupon BRAC launched the 
BCUP program in the treatment branches. The program organizers visited all the villages to locate potential borrowers based on the eligibility 
criteria.  
23 For balancing checks, we restricted our sample to the rice producing farm households surveyed in 2012 (3,292 households). 
24 The results of the balancing tests by rice variety are presented in Appendix A (Tables A1 and A2). 
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could result in biased study results if it is related to the initial assignment of subjects. We found 
an attrition rate of around 10 percent in the panel data used in the field experiment, and no 
significant difference between the attrition rates in the treatment group (11 percent) and control 
group (9 percent) for rice-producing farm households (see column 1).25 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
2.3 Data  
 
We used baseline data and follow-up survey data at the household level from the BCUP 
program. A total of 4,301 households (2,155 in treatment areas and 2,146 in control areas) were 
randomly selected to participate in a quantitative baseline survey in 2012, and a follow-up survey 
was conducted in 2014 (Hossain et al. 2018; Malek et al. 2015). For simplicity, we focused on 
rice-producing farms.26 The data include economic and demographic variables relating to farm 
households, as well as inputs and output in terms of rice production. Our input variables included 
land (decimals), labor (days), ploughing land in preparation for planting (number of times), seed 
(kilograms), irrigation (hours), fertilizer (kilograms), and pesticide (number of times used).  
3. Conceptual Framework: Credit Use, Change in Technology and 
Efficiency 
 
Once a farm enterprise obtains access to credit (), its output can be affected through 
various channels. In the following sections, we denote access to credit by a farm household by 
 , which takes a value of 1 if the farm household is assigned to the treatment group (eligible for 
credit under the BCUP program) and 0 otherwise. Being in the treatment group can increase the 
use of inputs by a credit-constrained farm, and can also lead to a shift in the production frontier. 
Meanwhile, it can also increase output by improving efficiency. There might also be a 
synergistic effect involving both technological change and efficiency improvement. We 
represent the general production function as: 
 
25 In column 2 of Table 3, we present results of the regression of attrition in the follow-up survey on treatment dummy and household covariates. 
and find no evidence that treatment assignment is statistically significantly related to household attrition status. 
26 Rice is a major crop produced in Bangladesh, and almost all of the farm families in the country grow rice. Rice is cultivated on 75 percent of the 
country’s cropland (Ganesh-Kumar, Prasad and Pullabhotla 2012), and is the primary source of income and employment for nearly 15 million farm 
households in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2008). 
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 = 
, ) − ) + ,          1) 
 
where  is the log of rice output,  is the vector of inputs including land, labor, machinery, 
seed, irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticides.   is noise, and  is technical inefficiency. Our primary 
objective is to examine the effect of Z on output while leaving the input vector unchanged, and 
decomposing the effect into a frontier shift and a change in efficiency. 
4. Estimation Strategy 
 
We estimate the impact of access to credit on productivity and efficiency by comparing 
the average outcomes of the treatment and control groups. Therefore, our estimates are based on 
the initial treatment assignment irrespective of households’ actual enrollment or participation in 
the BCUP program. We start by estimating the impact of credit expansion to farm households on 
the use of production inputs and adoption of modern rice varieties. Then, we examine the impact 
of credit expansion on productivity. A Cobb–Douglas (CD) production function is used to 
represent the production technology. To estimate the function, we initially use the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method, and then discuss the problem this approach presents in relation to 
decomposing the total effect on output into technological change and efficiency improvement 
effects. Next, the stochastic production frontier approach is presented, and we explain how we 
use this model as a tool to disentangle the two effects, frontier shift and efficiency 
improvement.27  
4.1 Effect of Credit Access on Input Use and Adoption of Modern Rice Varieties 
 
Before examining the overall impact of credit access on productivity, we check whether 
credit belongs to the input set by examining the impact of credit access on the use of different 
 
27 It is important to note that our analysis only covers a partial equilibrium effect and does not capture first-order general equilibrium effects. 
Moreover, the coverage of the BCUP credit program is not large enough to create a village-level effect. As noted in Section 2.1, the BCUP 
program uses the VO as the platform for service delivery. Members are grouped into teams of five, and three to eight teams consisting of 15 to 40 
members form a village-level tenant farmer association. BCUP program administrative data from 2012 suggest that sometimes the number of 
participants in a village is insufficient to form an association, and so two or three villages must be combined. Therefore, although the theoretical 
maximum number of BCUP participants from a village can be as many as 40, in reality the number is much lower, and is not a large proportion of 
the total number of farm households in a village. 
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inputs. As mentioned earlier,  is the treatment indicator. The difference in outcomes between 
the treatment and control groups (i.e., households with credit access and those without) is known 
as the intent to treat (ITT) effect, and is captured by the following OLS regression:  
 
 =  +  +   ,              2) 
where  is the outcome variable (use of land, labor, fertilizer, and pesticides and adoption of 
modern hybrid rice varieties),  is an indicator of assignment to either the treatment or control 
group, and  is the error term. The parameter of interest is , which captures the ITT effect —
the average effect of simply being offered access to the credit program—on changes in the 
outcome variables twenty-four months after the start of the intervention. We cluster the standard 
errors at the branch level to account for intra-cluster correlation. 
 
4.2 Effect of Credit Access on Productivity: Overall Effect 
 
To formalize our analysis, we use the indicator variable   to represent credit access and 
rewrite equation (1) (using the CD production function) as:  
         = 0 +   

+ 1 − ) +  ,                3) 
where  denotes each rice producing farm household,  is rice output per decimal (in log 
form), ln   is the log of input variable j per decimal of farm i,   is noise, and ) is the 
inefficiency term.   includes land (decimals), labor (days), ploughing land in preparation for 
planting (number of times), seed (kilograms), irrigation (hours), fertilizer (kilograms), and 
pesticide (number of times).28   
To explore the consequences of applying OLS in the presence of inefficiency, we further 
rewrite the equation as: 
 =  +    
 
+ !  − "#)$% +  
 
28Note that coefficient of & in specification (3) can be expressed as '( − 1. A positive coefficient indicates RTS of land is greater than 1 and a 
negative coefficient means RTS of land is less than 1. 
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               ≡  + ∑    +  + + ,   (3a) 
where + = , − !) − "#)$%-, and  =  − ")). By construction,  has a 
mean of zero, and so OLS can be used to estimate equation (3a).  
Therefore, as shown in equation (3a), the  term has two effects, represented by 
.  − "))/. The first term is the direct effect on technology, while the second term 
captures the effect on efficiency. If inefficiency is not explicitly modeled, the coefficient of  in 
equation (3a) will capture the mean overall effect of expanded credit access on productivity.29 In 
other words, if inefficiency is not explicitly included and ")) is approximately linear in 
  that is, ")) =  0 so that  =  +   0), the coefficient of  () will capture both 
the technology change (frontier shift, ) and the change in efficiency (0). The estimated 
coefficient of  in equation (3a) does not enable us to disentangle the frontier shift and 
efficiency improvement effects. 
4.3 Effect of Credit Access on Productivity: Separating the Frontier Shift Effect  
from the Efficiency Effect  
 
In this subsection, we use the stochastic frontier approach instead of the distribution-
free30 approach used in Subsection 4.2 to separate the frontier shift effect from the inefficiency 
effect.  
We specify our production model as follows: 
 = ∗ − ), ) ≥ 0 (4) 
            ∗ = 
34; 6) + .  (5) 
 
Equation (5) defines the stochastic production frontier function. Note that the error is 
composed of two terms – the inefficiency term ) and the noise term . For a given level of 
X, the frontier gives the maximum level of output (∗), and is stochastic because of the presence 
of . Rearrangement of equation (4) gives exp−)) = :; :;∗ (the ratio of actual output to 
 
29 One might argue that the effect of credit access on the production frontier operates through inputs: credit enables poor farmers to use pesticides 
and fertilizer, and buy modern seed varieties in a timely manner, thereby affecting the production frontier. However, the relationship might be linear 
for some inputs and nonlinear for others. For simplicity, we are trying to find the overall effect of credit access. Therefore, we add credit access as 
a separate factor in the production frontier (that is, γZ>) rather than examining the effect of credit through inputs. 
30 In this approach, the estimation results do not impose any distributional assumption on ). However, the major drawback of this approach is 
that the inefficiency effect cannot be separated from the noise (Z>) if the inefficiency is i.i.d. (a function of Z>). 
i
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maximum possible output), and the value of 1 − exp−))) × 100 is the percentage by 
which actual output falls short of the maximum possible output. Since exp−)) ≈ 1 −
), ) is referred to as the technical inefficiency of farm household . The presence of 
inefficiency gives rise to a composite error term . − )/, which is negatively skewed 
because ) is one-sided.31 We perform a simple OLS residual test to check for skewness of 
the error term, and thus the appropriateness of using the stochastic frontier specification. We also 
run a sample moment-based test following Coelli (1995). Both results reject the null hypothesis 
of no skewness in the OLS residuals in the baseline, suggesting the presence of inefficiency. 
As before, we use a simple CD technology function to represent 
. ). Additionally, we 
assume that the inefficiency term ()) follows a half-normal distribution. We parameterize 
) as a function of the treatment assignment variable (), and therefore allow the randomly 
assigned access to credit () to affect the expected value of the inefficiency. We then apply 
the maximum likelihood method to estimate the model parameters (parameters in 
. )) and 
inefficiency in the single-equation approach, following Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle 
(2015). Specifically, our model is: 
 
       = ∗ − ),        )  ≥ 0 (6) 
           ∗ =  346 +  +   ,  (7) 
                )~ BC0, DE0)),  (8) 
                DE0) = exp + ),  (9) 
                ~. . F B(0, DG0),  (10) 
 
where 3 is the vector of inputs32 and , , , , and DG0 are the parameters to be estimated.  
captures the impact of credit access on the frontier shift (technological change), while  
represents the effect of credit access (rather than the marginal effect of credit) on inefficiency. 
After estimating the model parameters and the (in)efficiency index under the single-equation 
approach, we obtain the marginal impact of credit access () on the expected value of the 
 
31 For a production-type stochastic frontier model with the composite error −),)≥ 0 and  distributed symmetrically around zero, the 
residuals from the corresponding OLS estimation should skew to the left (that is, negative skewness) regardless of the distribution function of 
) in the model estimation after pretesting. Thus, a test of the null hypothesis of no skewness can be constructed using the OLS residuals. If 
the estimated skewness has the expected sign, the rejection of the null hypothesis provides support for the existence of one-sided error.   
32 Inputs are in log form and include land (decimals), labor (days), ploughing land in preparation for planting (number of times), seed (kilograms), 
irrigation (hours), fertilizer (kilograms), and pesticide (number of times).   
1
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inefficiency ) from " = 1)) − " = 0)), where ")) = K2/M DE) =
K2/M  .5exp + ))). Therefore, the marginal effect of  is decomposed into the frontier 
shift effect (given by the coefficient of  in the production frontier, ) and the technical 
efficiency effect obtained from " = 1)) − "# = 0)$. The sum of these two values 
gives us the overall effect of  on output, holding all other inputs unchanged. It is important to 
mention that the sum of the two effects does not necessarily equal  in (3a) unless ")) is 
approximately linear.33 Also, note that although we model the credit access () as a determinant 
of inefficiency, we do not present any analysis on the variance of the noise term in this paper for 
simplicity.34   
5. Empirical Results 
 
Here, we present our estimates of the impact of treatment assignment or expanded credit 
access on productivity, technological change (frontier shift), and the technical efficiency of 
farmers. We performed the impact analysis over a 24-month period, and the results are divided 
into three subsections. In Subsection 5.1, we present the impact of credit access on input use and 
adoption of modern hybrid rice varieties. Then, in Subsection 5.2, we present the overall impact 
on productivity using the OLS estimation method and equation (3). We then decompose and 
analyze the sources of the effect on productivity, finding significant impacts of access to credit, 
both economically and statistically, on both productivity and efficiency. We examine the impacts 
relative to the amount of credit used. In Subsection 5.3, we examine the impact of access to 
credit broken down into various demographic and farm characteristics based on the baseline 
survey, and find heterogeneity of impact within the treatment group.  
 
5.1 Effect of Credit Access on Input Use and Adoption of Modern Hybrid Rice Varieties 
 
 
33Another reason why the sum of the two effects (from OLS) does not necessarily equal γ estimated using the maximum likelihood method is that 
the maximum likelihood method uses distributional assumptions, while OLS does not. 
34If we estimate our frontier model (equation 6 -10) with a modification of equation (10), where credit access () is used as a determinant of the 
noise term, we find that the error/noise variance is on average higher for the households with credit access compared to the control group. And, 
when we compute the variance of the composed error . − )/ as DE0) + DG0), then we find it smaller for =1, which is primarily due 
to the statistically significant negative effect of  on inefficiency. 
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First, we check whether credit belongs to the production input set. The impact of access 
to the BCUP credit program on the use of inputs and adoption of modern hybrid rice varieties 24 
months after the intervention is estimated using OLS and equation (2). The results are presented 
in Table 4. 
 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
We find that the treatment group is 15.64 percent more likely to adopt modern hybrid rice 
varieties than the control group. On average, treatment households use 2.26 times more 
pesticides, an important complementary input in modern hybrid rice production, than control 
households. We also find that treatment households use more land, seed, fertilizer, and 
machinery for land preparation but less labor and irrigation than control households. However, 
the standard errors relating to these variables are large, and therefore the differences are not 
statistically significant. Overall, the results presented in Table 4 suggest that access to credit 
causes a change in productivity through changes in the use of inputs and available technologies.  
 
5.2 Effect of Credit on Productivity, Technological Change, and Change in Efficiency 
 
We estimate the overall effect of being offered access to the credit program on changes in 
productivity 24 months after the intervention using OLS and equation (3). The estimates are 
presented in Table 5. We find an increase in rice yields of around 13.5 percent in treatment 
households compared to control households, and the impact is statistically significant at the 95 
percent level. The average baseline yield of 18.12 kilograms of rice per decimal implies an 
increase of approximately two kilograms of rice per decimal. In Table A3 in the Appendix, we 
divide rice varieties into modern hybrid varieties and high-yielding varieties (HYVs) and find a 
statistically significant positive treatment effect for yields of both HYVs and modern hybrid 
varieties (around 13 and 12 percent, respectively). Overall, we find a positive effect of expanded 
credit access on productivity.35  
 
 
35 The findings of table 4 show that rice variety choice is an outcome of the treatment status. This endogenous selection into rice variety can be a 
mediating mechanism of the productivity change differences by credit availability. Therefore, the results in Table A3 cannot be interpreted as the 
causal effect of credit availability on the productivity of a given rice variety. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 6 shows the results from the stochastic frontier model, which decomposes the 
impact of credit expansion into frontier shifts and efficiency changes.36 Columns (1) and (2) 
capture the effect of credit access on output that comes from a frontier shift, whereas columns (3) 
and (4) capture the effect that comes from efficiency improvements. We find a positive and 
statistically significant effect of credit access on frontier shifts. On average, around 11 percent of 
the overall productivity gain comes from technological change, or a frontier shift. The likely 
mechanism underlying this finding might be that in the absence of access to credit, households 
are more likely to continue with their conventional farming practices, and are unwilling to grow 
modern crop varieties that offer higher yields. The findings presented in Table 4 show that better 
access to credit enables farm households to introduce more productive modern hybrid rice 
varieties, which leads to a shift in the production frontier. 
We obtain the impact of credit access on inefficiency after estimating the model 
parameters and the efficiency index (Figure 4 shows the density plot of the inefficiency index). 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show that small-scale farms with access to subsidized credit are, 
on average, 3 percent more efficient than farm households with no access to credit. Given the 
average baseline rice yield of 18.12 kilograms per decimal, this positive effect on efficiency 
implies that credit access enabled treatment households to produce approximately half a 
kilogram more rice per decimal than control farms as a result of improved efficiency. The 
positive impact of access to credit is most pronounced among producers of modern hybrid rice 
varieties, who exhibit efficiency gains of 9 percent on average (see Table A4 in the Appendix).  
One possible explanation for these findings can be seen from the findings presented in 
Table 4, which show that access to credit significantly increases the adoption of hybrid rice 
varieties and the use of pesticides among the treatment group compared with the control group. 
Hybrid rice varieties offer higher potential yields than other rice varieties, but also require more 
complementary inputs and more timely use of variable inputs, which farmers find easier to 
manage with access to credit.37 Another possible factor might be a difference in knowledge about 
 
36 Mean baseline inefficiency is around 17 percent (estimated using equations 6–10 and baseline data), which implies that before obtaining access 
to credit, farmers lose around 17 percent, on average, of their potential rice output through inefficiency. 
37 It is also tempting to consider that unmeasured or poorly measured inputs will show up as efficiency. However, because of the experimental 
design, this potential measurement bias is likely to be the same in both the treatment and control groups, and thus will be cancelled out.   
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effective farming practices and the timely use of inputs. Although our study is limited to the 
impact of credit rather than the combined impact of credit and extension services, our analysis 
shows that treatment group farmers are more likely to be familiar with and discuss crop choices, 
input choices, and farming practices with agricultural extension service officers and providers 
than control group farmers (see Table A5 in the Appendix). 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
We also examine the impact of the amount of credit received on marginal returns while 
all other factors of production remain constant. Figure 4 shows our estimates of rice yields and 
efficiency divided into ten groups based on the amount of credit received. After taking the 
confidence intervals into consideration, we find that the impact on yields is uniform regardless of 
the amount of credit received, and thus we fail to find evidence that changes in the amount of 
credit received affect yields (Figure 5, panel A). In other words, regardless of the amount of 
credit received, the impact on marginal productivity remains the same. We also find no evidence 
of differences in terms of technical efficiency among farmers based on the amount of credit 
received (Figure 5, panel B).  
 
[Figure 5 Panel A and Panel B about here] 
 
5.3 Heterogeneous Effect of Credit Access 
 
In this section, we explore the impact of credit access based on several demographic and 
farm characteristics. In particular, we focus on gender and level of education of the household 
head, land area, and tenancy arrangements. We augment specifications (4) and (10) to estimate 
the heterogeneity of the impact on output and efficiency, respectively.  
To capture the heterogeneity of the effect on rice productivity, we estimate: 
 
  =  +  +  OO
P
OQ
+  R S 
T
 Q
+   S 
T
 Q
∗  +  ,        11) 
             
where S  is a vector of economic and demographic variables j for farm household i. We interact 
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S  with the household’s treatment assignment status (). All other variables in O are the 
same as before. 
Since  is a dummy variable from (12), the marginal effect of  on technological 
change is given by "|S, ,  = 1) −  "|S, ,  = 0) = ! +  + ∑ OOPOQ +
 ∑ R S T Q + ∑  S T Q % − ! + ∑ OOPOQ +  ∑ R S T Q  % =  + ∑  S T Q . The coefficient of 
the interaction term   in equation (12) captures the heterogeneous effect of expanded credit 
access within the treatment group. Note that this depends on the values of S . Our S  variables are 
dummy variables representing various demographic and farm characteristics, the means of which 
are presented in Table A6 in the Appendix.  
To examine the difference between the heterogeneous and homogeneous models in terms 
of inefficiency, we add the inefficiency term V) in (11) and examine the difference between 
the mean inefficiencies, that is, ".V)| = 1/ − ".V)| = 0/, where V  are the 
determinants of inefficiency. The V  variables are the same in both the frontier function and the 
determinants of inefficiency. Within the treatment group, to capture the degree of heterogeneity 
in the effect of credit access on efficiency, we re-estimate our frontier model (equations 6–10) 
after modifying equation (9) as follows:  
 
DE0V)= WXY +  +  ∑ Z S T Q + ∑ [ S T Q ∗ ),   12) 
 
where V =  +  +  ∑ Z S T Q + ∑ [ S T Q ∗  . The marginal effect of Z on mean 
inefficiency can be calculated as follows: ".V)| = 1/ − ".V)| = 0/ = K2/M ∗
.5 WXY# +  +  ∑ Z S T Q + ∑ [ S T Q $ − WXY  +  ∑ Z S T Q )) =  K2/M ∗
.5) WXY   +  ∑ [ S T Q ). Clearly, the marginal effect of access to credit on inefficiency 
depends on the I variables. The marginal effect via technological change is  + ∑  S T Q , 
which also depends on the I variables.  
Tables 7 and 8 show the estimates of the degree of heterogeneity in the effect of access to 
credit. 
  
[Table 7 about here] 
[Table 8 about here] 
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Columns 1–4 of Tables 7 and 8 show the effects of credit access based on the gender and 
level of education of the household head. Several studies have found gender differences in the 
take-up of credit, use of fertilizer, use of capital, and adoption of new technology (Udry 1996, 
Tiruneh et al. 2001). Belanger and Li (2009) find that women have less control over assets, 
access to credit, and influence in decision-making regarding extension services and inputs, 
resulting in lower farmer productivity. We found that female-headed farms that are provided 
with access to credit generate, on average, approximately 7 percent more in terms of output than 
male-led farms with credit access (see Table 7). In terms of efficiency (Table 8), we found that 
female-led enterprises with access to credit were 1.5 percent more efficient than male-led 
enterprises with access to credit. However, the results were not statistically significant. Our 
findings in relation to the education level of the household head were similar, but once again, not 
statistically significant. 
Next, we consider the baseline farm size. Previous empirical studies have found an 
inverse relationship between farm size and output per hectare (Cornia 1985; Fan and Chan-Kang 
2003). Some studies have suggested that this is the result of errors in measuring soil quality and 
land size (Fan and Chan-Kang 2003), while other studies have found that this inverse 
relationship disappears at high levels of technology adoption (Cornia 1985). We examined the 
relationship between credit access and yield or efficiency based on farm land size and found a 
negative relationship, suggesting that within the treatment group, the average effect of access to 
credit is greater for larger farms. However, we did not find a statistically significant difference 
between large and small farms in terms of estimates of heterogeneity in relation to the effect of 
access to credit. 
Finally, we tested for differences in the impact of access to credit based on land 
ownership and tenancy status. For both technological change and efficiency outcomes, we found 
a significantly positive effect for pure tenant and mixed-tenant farm enterprises compared with 
farm enterprises that only cultivated their own land. The marginal effect of credit access on 
productivity was around 14 percent for pure tenant farm households (i.e., those that only 
cultivated other people’s land).38 Columns 7 and 8 of Table 7 show that within the treatment 
 
38 From columns 7 and 8, it can be seen that γ= 13.06, δ]=3.45. The mean for pure tenant farm households is 0.32, which implies that 32 percent 
of farm households in the sample only cultivate other people’s land, therefore the effect of the treatment assignment is (13.06+(3.45*0.32)) =14.16. 
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group, the effect of credit on productivity is approximately 3.5 percent higher for tenant farm 
households than for farmers who cultivate their own land. In the case of efficiency change, the 
impact for pure tenant farms is, on average, 5 percent higher than for owner farms (column 8 of 
Table 8). In terms of farming practices, we found that when there is access to credit, adoption of 
hybrid rice varieties is significantly higher among tenant farm enterprises than among farms that 
cultivate their own land. This suggests that relatively resource-poor farm enterprises gain more 
from access to credit. 
6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Access to subsidized credit can aid small farm households in increasing their productivity 
by enabling them to adopt better technology and/or enabling efficiency improvements. In this 
study, we analyze data from a field experiment based on the random assignment of credit access 
in Bangladesh to estimate the impact of credit expansion on farm productivity. In particular, we 
examine whether the productivity increase is the result of changes in technology or improved 
efficiency. First, we examine whether being offered access to the credit program changes the 
amounts and types of inputs used. Then, we estimate the average overall impact of credit access 
on rice yields and examine the sources of changes in productivity. We use the stochastic 
production frontier model as a tool to disentangle the two effects, technological change and 
change in efficiency. 
We find that relaxing the credit constraint has a significant positive impact on rice yields, 
via both technological change and improved efficiency of farmers. We find a positive impact of 
access to credit on total productivity that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. On 
average, we find a productivity increase of around 14 percent among farmers provided with 
access to credit services. After decomposing the overall output effect into frontier shift and 
efficiency change effects, we find that most of the effect, around 11 percent, is related to a 
frontier shift, that is, the adoption of modern hybrid rice varieties and the use of complementary 
inputs. In terms of technical efficiency, we find that small-scale farms with access to subsidized 
credit experience, on average, a 3 percent increase in efficiency compared with households with 
no access to credit. This effect is even more pronounced in relation to modern hybrid rice 
varieties, which deliver efficiency gains of around 9 percent on average. We find no evidence of 
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more sizable impacts on yields and efficiency among farmers that take up larger amounts of 
credit. Within the treatment group, the impact is greater among pure tenant and mixed-tenant 
farming households than among farmers that only cultivate their own land.  
A simple story helps to explain the positive impacts that we observed. When farmers 
have limited recourse to well-functioning credit markets, they are unlikely to adopt modern high-
yielding crop varieties that require more cash upfront to buy seed and complementary inputs that 
must be obtained and used in a timely manner. Provision of credit provides a liquidity buffer that 
enables these farmers to adopt modern crop varieties and apply and manage complementary 
inputs in a more effective and timely manner, which ultimately leads to higher productivity and 
efficiency compared with households that do not have access to credit. We find that on average, 
households with access to BCUP credit are more likely to adopt modern hybrid rice varieties 
than households with no access to credit. Pesticides are essential in the production process and 
for the stability of yields of hybrid rice, and we find that households in the treatment group 
procure significantly more pesticides than those in the control group. When credit is available, 
adoption of hybrid rice varieties is significantly higher among tenant farm enterprises than 
among enterprises that cultivate their own land, which suggests that the more resource-poor the 
farm enterprise, the greater the benefit from obtaining access to credit.  
The findings of this study have important implications for policy, especially in relation to 
resource-constrained contexts. This study adds to our knowledge of the potential benefits of 
credit programs targeting subsistence farm enterprises, and the findings can help inform 
decisions aimed at achieving better targeting by such programs.  
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Figure 1: Design of Field Experiment and Treatment Assignment 
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Figure 2: Map of Treatment and Control Areas 
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Figure 3: BCUP Program Features 
Treatment Groups Program Features 
 Credit Limit: 5,000 taka-120,000 taka* 
 Duration: 6-10 months 
Treatment Group Grace Period: 1 month 
 Installment: monthly 
 Interest Rate: 10percent (flat)** 
Control Group None 
Note: *79 taka=1 USD; **In the flat rate method, interest is charged on the full original loan amount throughout the loan term whereas in the declining 
balance method, interest calculation is based on the outstanding loan balance – the balance of money that remains in the borrower’s hands as the loan is 
repaid during the loan term. BCUP provided loans to farmers at subsided interest rate of 10 per cent per year (flat rate). The effective rate of interest is about 
15 to 20 per cent on declining balance method, depending on the mode of repayment of the principal and interest due. As per the rules of the Microcredit 
Regulatory (MRA) of the Bangladesh Bank, NGOs can charge up to a maximum of 27 per cent rate of interest on declining balance for their microfinance 
operations. 
 
Figure 4: Density Plot of Inefficiency Index 
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Figure 5: Impact of Credit by the Amount of Credit Taken 
 
Panel A: Impact on Rice Yield Panel B: Impact on Efficiency 
(percentage effect) 
 
Note: 79 taka= 1 USD 
 
Note: 79 taka= 1 USD 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Baseline Characteristics 
 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Composition    
Female Headed household 3,292 0.07 0.26 
Age of household head (in years) 3,292 44.82 11.66 
Household size (number of members) 3,292 4.87 1.79 
Number of children (<16 years) 3,292 3.11 1.35 
Number of adult members (>16 years) 3,292 1.75 1.25 
Household head with no education 3,292 0.45 0.49 
Amount of Land     
Own cultivated land (in decimal1) 3,292 39.38 51.75 
Rented in land (in decimal) 3,292 48.63 64.57 
Rented out land (in decimal) 3,292 8.08 27.52 
Total cultivated land (in decimal) 3,292 88.02 75.17 
Amount of Credit and Interest Rate    
Formal and informal loan amount (in taka) 3,292 5221.04 28101.67 
Interest rate of loans from formal2 institutions (percent) 320 11.15 3.91 
Interest rate of loans from informal3 institutions (percent) 287 18.00 12.83 
Output and Input for Rice Production (yearly)   
Rice yield (total rice/total land)4 3,292 18.12 4.27 
High Yielding Variety rice yield (HYV rice/ land in HYV rice) 3,218 17.02 4.17 
Hybrid rice yield (HB rice/ land in HB rice) 213 20.18 7.18 
Traditional Variety rice yield (TV rice/ land in TV rice) 1,307 9.83 3.44 
Total land (in decimal) 3,292 99.70 85.28 
Total labor days (own as well as hired labor) 3,292 46.37 39.80 
Total plough (number of times) 3,292 6.61 6.03 
Total seed (kilogram) 3,292 17.27 18.80 
Total irrigation (hours) 3,292 45.60 51.62 
Total fertilizer (kilogram) 3,292 168.30 150.62 
Total pesticide (number of times) 3,292 4.27 5.65 
Notes: Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). 1Land is measured in decimal. 
A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimal=1 hectare. 2Formal 
institutions include bank and cooperatives. 3Informal lenders include moneylenders, loans from friends/family, and buying goods/services on credit from 
sellers. 4Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds).  
Own land refers to the cultivated crop land owned by the farm household.  Rented in land means the land rented in from others for crop cultivation. Rented 
out land means the land rented to other farmers for crop cultivation. 
High Yielding Varieties (HYV) rice seeds are land substituting, water economizing, more labor using, and employment generating innovation. HYVs 
significantly outperform traditional varieties in the presence of an efficient management of irrigation, pesticides, and fertilizers. However, in the absence of 
these inputs, traditional varieties may outperform HYVs. 
Hybrid rice is any genealogy of rice produced by crossbreeding different kinds of rice. It typically displays heterosis or hybrid vigor such that when it is 
grown under the same conditions as comparable high yielding inbred rice varieties it can produce up to 30percent more rice. However, the heterosis effect 
disappears after the first (F1) generation, so the farmers cannot save seeds produced from a hybrid crop and need to purchase new F1 seeds every season to 
get the heterosis effect each time. 
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Table 2: Baseline Characteristics and Balancing 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value1 
(3) 
Variables    
Household Composition    
Female headed household (percentage) 0.05 0.09 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01)  
Age of household head (in years) 44.67 44.98   0.69 
 (0.28) (0.26)  
Household size (number of members) 4.82 4.92   0.59 
 (0.04) (0.05)  
Number of adult members (>16 years) 3.15 3.08 0.49 
 (0.03) (0.03)  
Number of children (<16 years) 1.67 1.84 0.19 
 (0.03) (0.03)  
Household head with no education 0.45 0.45 0.92 
 (0.01) (0.01)  
Amount of Land     
Own cultivated land (in decimal2) 40.92 37.76 0.35 
 (1.29) (1.25)  
Rented in land (in decimal) 49.86   47.32 0.61 
 (1.69) (1.48)  
Rented out land (in decimal) 8.24 7.92 0.78 
 (0.67) (0.69)  
Total cultivated land (in decimal) 90.79 85.09 0.42 
 (1.96) (1.71)  
Amount of Credit and Interest Rate    
Formal and informal3 loan amount (in taka) 5136.45 5,316.45 0.91 
 (581.53) (798.93)  
Interest rate of loans from formal institutions (percent) 10.43 11.24   0.39 
 (3.55) (4.07)  
Interest rate of loans from informal institutions (percent) 18.00 18.47   0.89 
 (15.36) (15.50)  
Access to Other BRAC Programs and Services 
Member of other BRAC loan programs (dummy) 0.02 0.01 0.76 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Received other services besides credit (dummy) 0.01 0.00 
0.51 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Notes:  1Column 3 shows the P value of the test of equality of means by random assignment of credit access (whether the means of the variables are statistically 
significantly similar to each other).  2A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 
247 decimals=1 hectare.  3The formal source includes government bank, commercial bank, and other government and non-government loan institutions. 
Informal sources include friends and relatives, traditional moneylenders, landlords etc.   
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline 2012 (3,292 households). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at Branch level. Informal lenders include moneylenders, loans from friends/family, and buying goods/services on credit from sellers. 
Own land refers to the cultivated crop land owned by the farm household.  Rented in land means the land rented in from others for crop cultivation. Rented 
out land means the land rented to other farmers for crop cultivation.   
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Table 2 (contd.): Baseline Characteristics and Balancing 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Variables    
Output and Input for Rice Production (yearly)    
Rice yield (total rice/total land)4 18.79 17.40 0.24 
 (0.12) (0.10)  
High Yielding Variety rice yield (HYV rice/ land in HYV rice) 18.66 17.33 0.28 
 (0.11) (0.09)  
Hybrid rice yield (HB rice/ land in HB rice) 20.39 19.94 0.79 
 (0.73) (0.65)  
Traditional Variety rice yield (TV rice/ land in TV rice) 9.45 10.23 0.98 
 (0.13) (0.14)  
Total Land (in decimal) 91.39 108.52 0.10 
 (1.85) (2.12)  
Total Labor (days) 41.99 51.03   0.10 
 (0.87) (1.08)  
Total Plough (number of times) 6.40   6.85 0.48 
 (0.14) (0.14)  
Total Seed (kilogram) 17.36 17.18 0.94 
 (0.49) (0.43)  
Total Irrigation (hours) 44.27 47.03 0.74 
 (1.19) (1.15)  
Total Fertilizer (kilogram)  157.79 179.45 0.11 
 (3.42) (3.57)  
Total Pesticide (number of times) 4.58 3.96 0.38 
 (0.14) (0.11)  
Observations 1,694 1,598  
Joint significance test 
  F (16, 39) =   1.64 
  Prob > F =    0.13 
Notes: 4Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (247 decimals=1 hectare.)  ††kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 
pounds).  Column 3 shows the P value of the test of equality of means by random assignment of credit access (whether the means of the variables are statistically 
significantly similar to each other). 
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline 2012 (3,292 households). Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at Branch level. High Yielding Varieties (HYV) rice seeds are land substituting, water economizing, more labor using, and 
employment generating innovation. HYVs significantly outperform traditional varieties in the presence of an efficient management of irrigation, pesticides, 
and fertilizers. However, in the absence of these inputs, traditional varieties may outperform HYVs. 
Hybrid rice is any genealogy of rice produced by crossbreeding different kinds of rice. It typically displays heterosis or hybrid vigor such that when it is 
grown under the same conditions as comparable high yielding inbred rice varieties it can produce up to 30percent more rice. However, the heterosis effect 
disappears after the first (F1) generation, so the farmers cannot save seeds produced from a hybrid crop and need to purchase new F1 seeds every season to 
get the heterosis effect each time.  
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Table 3: Attrition Rate 
Dependent Variable: Attrited Households (1= household with baseline information but no 
follow-up information) 
  (1) (2) 
Treatment Assignment (1=household assigned to treatment group) -0.02 -0.03 
Female Headed household (percentage)  0.16** 
Age of household head (in years)  0.00 
Household head with no education (percentage)  -0.02* 
Any baseline formal and informal loan (yes=1)  0.01 
Observations 3,755 3,755 
Notes: Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). Informal lenders include 
moneylenders, loans from friends/family, and buying goods/services on credit from sellers. 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Access to Credit on Input Use and Adoption of Modern Hybrid Rice 
Variables Effect of Credit Access Observations 
Total Land (in decimal) 2.03 3,172 
 (14.68)  
Total Labor (days) -0.83 3,172 
 (7.88)  
Total Seed (kilogram) 4.15 3,172 
 (3.27)  
Total Irrigation (hours) -3.36 3,172 
 (12.24)  
Total Fertilizer (kilogram) 27.19 3,172 
 (29.73)  
Total Pesticide (number of times) 2.26** 3,172 
 (1.04)  
Total Plough (number of times) 0.95 3,172 
 (0.96)  
Adoption of Modern Hybrid Rice1 (dummy) 14.38*** 3,172 
 (2.50)  
Control for Baseline Covariates Yes   
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. †Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimal) which 
is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 hectares. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 
at the branch level. 1Adoption is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the farm produces Hybrid rice in endline but has zero baseline production.  
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Table 5: Impact of Access to Credit on Productivity of Rice 
Variables 
Effect of Credit 
on Productivity 
Effect of Credit 
on Productivity Observations 
 (1) (2) 
Rice yield (Total rice/Total land)1 13.54*** 13.80*** 
2,267  (3.07) (3.03) 
Average rice yield at baseline (Total rice/Total land) 18.12  
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes  
Control for Baseline covariates no yes  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimel) which 
is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 hectares. Column (1) and (2) shows the impact of credit 
access on outcome of interest. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Branch level. 
 
Table 6: Impact of Access to Credit on Frontier Shift and Efficiency of Rice Production 
(percentage effect) 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Rice Yield (kilogram of rice per decimal of 
land) 
 Frontier 
Shift 
Frontier 
Shift 
Inefficiency Inefficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit access (1=assigned in treatment group) 10.67*** 10.79*** -2.97* -3.18** 
 (1.15) (1.11) (1.57) (1.42) 
Mean Baseline Inefficiency in Rice Production 17.15 
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes yes yes 
Baseline Covariates no yes no yes 
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 
Notes: Unit of observation is household. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is 
measured in decimal which is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m2); 247 decimals=1 hectare. Standard error in 
parenthesis and are clustered at branch level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Heterogeneous Impact of Access to Credit on Rice Production 
Variables Dependent Variable: Rice Yield (kilogram of rice per decimal of land) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit access (1=assigned in treatment group) 13.31*** 13.40*** 13.31*** 13.45*** 14.27*** 14.36*** 12.96*** 13.06*** 
 
(3.04) (3.09) (3.23) (3.20) (3.04) (3.00) (3.01) (2.99) 
Female headed household (dummy) -6.28 -6.42     
  
 
(4.81) (4.75)     
  
Access to credit*Female headed household 6.69 7.13     
  
 
(4.87) (4.82)     
  
Head with no education (dummy)   1.23 1.21   
  
   
(1.30) (1.41)   
  
Access to credit*Head with no education   0.47 0.45   
  
   
(1.30) (0.62)   
  
Small farm size (1=cultivated land<50 decimal)     1.73 1.65 
  
     
(1.58) (1.55) 
  
Access to credit*Small farm size (1=cultivated land<50 decimal)     -2.82 -0.27 
  
     
(1.87) (1.88) 
  
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for Baseline Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Mean Baseline Rice Yield (Total rice/Total land) 18.12 
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample includes all rice producing farm households. Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimel) which 
is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 hectare. Results show the percentage effect of access to credit on rice production efficiency by different 
farm household characteristics. Small farm size takes a value 1 if total cultivated land by farm household is less than 50 decimals. Familiarity with agriculture extension service provider implies that farmers are 
acquainted with the persons/institution from whom they can seek information or advice on crop selection, crop rotation, modern cropping technology, appropriate use of fertilizer, pesticide etc. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at Branch level.   
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Table 7 (contd.): Heterogeneous Impact of Access to Credit on Rice Production 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Rice Yield 
(kilogram of rice per decimal of land) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pure tenant farm households (1= no own land rice cultivation)       -2.10* -1.53 
       (1.13) (1.40) 
Access to credit*Pure tenant farm households (1= no own land rice cultivation)       3.50** 3.45** 
       (1.54) (1.45) 
Mixed tenant farms (1=cultivate own land as well as others land)       0.45 0.58 
       (1.18) (1.43) 
Access to credit*Mixed tenant farms (1=cultivate own land as well as others land)       1.79 1.74 
       (1.55) (1.56) 
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for Baseline Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Mean Baseline Rice Yield (Total rice/Total land) 18.12 
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample includes all rice producing farm households. †Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimel) which 
is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 hectare. Results show the percentage effect of access to credit on rice production efficiency by different 
farm household characteristics. Pure owner farm households only cultivated their own land. Pure tenant farm households have no rice cultivation in own land- they chose either share cropping or rent or both. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at Branch level. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Impact of Access to Credit on Efficiency of Rice Production (percentage effect) 
Variables Dependent Variable: Inefficiency in Total Rice Yield 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit access (1=assigned in treatment group) -2.41 -2.41* -2.7* -2.7* -4.03** -4.03** -2.38 -2.68* 
 (1.50) (1.39) (1.56) (1.55) (1.55) (1.44) (1.47) (1.54) 
Female headed household (dummy) 5.85** 0.99       
 (2.61) (2.72)       
Access to credit*Female headed household -8.44** -1.49       
 (3.08) (3.19)       
Head with no education (dummy)   -1.23 -1.30     
   (1.03) (1.03)     
Access to credit*Head with no education   -2.04 -1.69     
   (1.5) (7.24)     
Small farm size (1=cultivated land<50 decimal)     -0.07 -0.44   
     (1.25) (1.22)   
Access to credit*Small farm size (1=cultivated land<50 decimal)     3.10 2.98   
     (1.87) (1.80)   
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for Baseline Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Mean Baseline Inefficiency in Rice Production 17.15 
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 
Notes: Sample includes all rice producing farm households. Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimal) which is a unit of area in India and 
Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m2); 247 decimals=1 hectare. Results show the percentage effect of access to credit on rice production efficiency by different farm household characteristics. 
Small farm size takes a value 1 if total cultivated land by farm household is less than 50 decimals. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at Branch level. 
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Table 8 (contd.): Heterogeneous Impact of Access to Credit on Efficiency of Rice Production 
(percentage effect) 
Variables Dependent Variable: Inefficiency in Total Rice Yield 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pure tenant farm households (1= no own land rice cultivation)       2.41** 1.15 
       (1.11) (1.11) 
Access to credit*Pure tenant farm households (1= no own land rice cultivation)       -5.05** -4.77*** 
       (1.83) (1.54) 
Mixed tenant farms (1=cultivate own land as well as others land)       0.34 -1.54 
       (1.32) (1.32) 
Access to credit*Mixed tenant farms (1=cultivate own land as well as others land)       -6.20** -2.42** 
       (2.19) (0.76) 
Model includes all other production inputs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Control for Baseline Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Mean Baseline Inefficiency in Rice Production 17.15 
Observations 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 2,267 
Notes: Sample includes all rice producing farm households. Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimal) which is a unit of area in India and 
Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m2); 247 decimals=1 hectare. Results show the percentage effect of access to credit on rice production efficiency by different farm household characteristics. 
Pure tenant farm households have no rice cultivation in own land- they chose either share cropping or rent or both. Mixed tenants cultivate own as well as others land. Pure and Mixed tenants are compared to the 
base category of Pure owner farm households who only cultivated their own land. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at Branch level. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1: GIS mapping for southern Region under study areas 
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Table A1: Baseline Characteristics and Balancing for HYV Rice Producing Households 
 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Variables    
Household Composition    
Female headed household  0.05 0.09 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01)  
Age of household head (in years) 44.58 44.99 0.59 
 
(0.29) (0.29)  
Household size (number of members) 4.83 4.93 0.6 
 (0.04) (0.05)  
Number of adult members (>16 years) 3.15 3.09 0.55 
 (0.03) (0.04)  
Number of child (<16 years) 1.68 1.84 0.22 
 (0.03) (0.03)  
Household head with no education  0.45 0.46 0.87 
 
(0.01) (0.01)   
Amount of Land and Credit     
Own cultivated land (in decimal†) 40.96 37.8 0.35 
 (1.31) (1.27)  
Rented in land (in decimal) 50.04 46.82 0.51 
 (1.71) (1.40)  
Rented out land (in decimal) 8.40 7.97 0.71 
 (0.69) (0.70)  
Total cultivated land (in decimal) 91.00 84.62 0.37 
 (2.00) (1.64)  
Formal and informal loan amount (in taka) 5084.18 5304.47 0.89 
 (591.44) (810.23)   
Notes: †A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 
hectares.     ††kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Column 3 shows the P value of mean difference column 3=column1- column2. 
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at Branch level. Informal lenders include moneylenders, loans from friends/family, and buying goods/services on credit from sellers. 
Own land refers to the cultivated crop land owned by the farm household.  Rented in land means the land rented in from others for crop cultivation. 
Rented out land means the land rented to other farmers for crop cultivation.   
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Table A1 (contd.): Baseline Characteristics and Balancing for HYV Rice Producing 
Households 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Variables    
Output and Input for Rice Production (yearly)    
Rice yield (total rice/total land) †† 17.52 16.63 0.21 
 (0.11) (0.09)  
High Yielding Variety rice yield (HYV rice/ land in HYV rice) 18.66 17.33 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.09)  
Hybrid rice yield (HB rice/ land in HB rice) 19.09 21.73 0.17 
 (0.9) (0.66)  
Traditional Variety rice yield (TV rice/ land in TV rice) 9.45 9.96 0.53 
 (0.16) (0.20)  
Total Land (in decimal) 115.38 123.28 0.55 
 
(2.58) (2.50) 
 
Total Labor (days) 47.69 55.44 0.07 
 (1.04) (1.15)  
Total Plough (number of times) 7.26 7.47 0.77 
 (0.17) (0.16)  
Total Seed (kilogram) 20.82 19.34 0.57 
 (0.56) (0.45)  
Total Irrigation (hours) 47.92 47.45 0.96 
 (1.35) (1.30)  
Total Fertilizer (kilogram) 174.78 189.24 0.36 
 (4.1) (3.97)  
Total Pesticide (number of times) 4.97 4.14 0.27 
 (0.16) (0.13)   
Notes: †† Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (247 decimals=1 hectares.)  Column 3 shows the P value 
of mean difference column 3=column1- column2. 
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at Branch level. High Yielding Varieties (HYV) rice seeds are land substituting, water economizing, more labor using, and employment 
generating innovation. HYVs significantly outperform traditional varieties in the presence of an efficient management of irrigation, pesticides, and 
fertilizers. However, in the absence of these inputs, traditional varieties may outperform HYVs. 
Hybrid rice is any genealogy of rice produced by crossbreeding different kinds of rice. It typically displays heterosis or hybrid vigor such that when it 
is grown under the same conditions as comparable high yielding inbred rice varieties it can produce up to 30percent more rice. However, the heterosis 
effect disappears after the first (F1) generation, so the farmers cannot save seeds produced from a hybrid crop and need to purchase new F1 seeds every 
season to get the heterosis effect each time. 
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Table A2: Baseline Characteristics and Balancing for Hybrid Rice Producing Households 
 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Variables    
Household Composition    
Female headed household    0.03   0.02   0.76 
 (0.02) (0.01)  
Age of household head (in years) 46.03 44.35 0.25 
 
(1.06) (1.11)  
Household size (number of members) 4.72 4.69 0.93 
 (0.17) (0.16)  
Number of adult members (>16 years) 3.33 3.07 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.13)  
Number of child (<16 years) 1.39 1.62 0.33 
 (0.10) (0.12)  
Household head with no education  0.41 0.27 0.11 
 
(0.05) (0.04) 
 
Amount of Land and Credit     
Own cultivated land (in decimal†) 50.54   55.24 0.59 
 (5.10) (6.51)  
Rented in land (in decimal) 62.75 66.50 0.81 
 (7.76) (10.34)  
Rented out land (in decimal) 2.56 7.49 0.10 
 (0.97) (2.79)  
Total cultivated land (in decimal) 113.29 121.75 0.58 
 (8.07) (11.33)  
Formal and informal loan amount (in taka) 4669.64 3930.69 0.80 
 (1363.97) (1760.58)  
Notes: †A decimal (also spelled decimel) is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 
hectares.     ††kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Column 3 shows the P value of mean difference column 3=column1- column2. 
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at Branch level. Informal lenders include moneylenders, loans from friends/family, and buying goods/services on credit from sellers. 
Own land refers to the cultivated crop land owned by the farm household.  Rented in land means the land rented in from others for crop cultivation. 
Rented out land means the land rented to other farmers for crop cultivation.   
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Table A2 (contd.): Baseline Characteristics and Balancing for Hybrid Rice Producing 
Households 
 Means by treatment  
 Control 
(1) 
Treatment 
(2) 
P-value 
(3) 
Variables    
Output and Input for Rice Production (yearly)    
Rice yield (total rice/total land) †† 18.51   16.89 0.38 
 (0.57) (0.48)  
High Yielding Variety rice yield (HYV rice/ land in HYV rice) 17.66 15.48 0.18 
 (0.63) (0.47)  
Hybrid rice yield (HB rice/ land in HB rice) 20.39 19.94 0.87 
 (0.73) (0.65)  
Traditional Variety rice yield (TV rice/ land in TV rice) 9.60 10.21 0.54 
 (0.44) (0.74)  
Total Land (in decimal) 161.12   157.63 0.91 
 
(12.75) (11.22) 
 
Total Labor (days)   69.14  70.32 0.93 
 (5.24) (5.31)  
Total Plough (number of times) 9.79 10.59 0.64 
 (0.85) (0.76)  
Total Seed (kilogram) 31.66 34.62 0.50 
 (2.99) (2.84)  
Total Irrigation (hours) 55.58 66.80 0.55 
 (5.02) (6.26)  
Total Fertilizer (kilogram) 218.08 258.82 0.44 
 (18.58) (19.14)  
Total Pesticide (number of times) 7.66 4.68 0.01 
 (0.80) (0.50)   
Notes: †† Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (247 decimals=1 hectares.)  Column 3 shows the P value 
of mean difference column 3=column1- column2. 
Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed at baseline (2012). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at Branch level. High Yielding Varieties (HYV) rice seeds are land substituting, water economizing, more labor using, and employment 
generating innovation. HYVs significantly outperform traditional varieties in the presence of an efficient management of irrigation, pesticides, and 
fertilizers. However, in the absence of these inputs, traditional varieties may outperform HYVs. 
Hybrid rice is any genealogy of rice produced by crossbreeding different kinds of rice. It typically displays heterosis or hybrid vigor such that when it 
is grown under the same conditions as comparable high yielding inbred rice varieties it can produce up to 30percent more rice. However, the heterosis 
effect disappears after the first (F1) generation, so the farmers cannot save seeds produced from a hybrid crop and need to purchase new F1 seeds every 
season to get the heterosis effect each time. 
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Table A3: Impact of Access to Credit on Rice Productivity (For HYV and Hybrid Rice) 
Variables 
Effect of 
Credit 
Access 
(1) 
Effect of  
Credit 
Access 
(2) 
Observations 
High Yielding Variety rice yield (HYV rice/ Land in HYV rice) 12.49*** 12.61*** 
2,831  (0.83) (0.76) 
Hybrid rice yield (HB rice/ Land in HB rice) 10.77* 11.78** 
412  (1.37) (1.09) 
Average rice yield at baseline (Total rice/Total land) 18.12  
Control for Baseline covariates No Yes   
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Rice is measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal (also spelled decimel) 
which is a unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²); 247 decimals=1 hectares. Column (1) and (2) shows the 
impact of the treatment on outcome of interest. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the Branch level. 
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Table A4: Impact of Credit Access on Frontier Shift and Efficiency of Rice Production (percentage effect) 
Variables 
High Yielding Variety Rice Yield 
(HYV Rice/Land in HYV) 
Hybrid Rice Yield 
(HB Rice/Land in HB) 
 
Impact 
on 
Frontier 
Shift 
Impact 
on 
Frontier 
Shift 
Impact 
on 
Inefficiency 
Impact 
on 
Inefficiency 
Impact 
on 
Frontier 
Shift 
Impact 
on 
Frontier 
Shift 
Impact 
on 
Inefficiency 
Impact 
on 
Inefficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Credit access (1=assigned in treatment 
group) 
10.89*** 9.94*** -1.68 -3.13** 2.70 3.17 -9.39** -8.58** 
 (1.15) (1.15) (1.60) (1.58) (3.81) (3.86) (3.99) (3.94) 
Mean Inefficiency in Rice Production 13.86 13.84 13.86 13.84 17.21 16.44 17.21 16.44 
Baseline Covariates no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 2,187 2,187 2,036 2,036 269 269 269 269 
Notes: Unit of observation is household. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 pounds). Land is measured in decimal which is a 
unit of area in India and Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m2); 247 decimals=1 hectares. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at Branch level.
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Table A5: Impact of Access to Credit on Familiarity with Agricultural Extension Officers  
Variables 
Effect of Credit 
Access 
Observations 
Familiarity with Agricultural extension 
officers1 (dummy) 12.15 3,172 
 (9.50)  
Discussion about production and farm 
practices2 (dummy) 10.89 3,172 
 (9.76)  
Control for Baseline Covariates Yes   
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the branch level. 1Familiarity with 
agriculture extension service provider implies that farmers are acquainted with the persons/institution from whom they 
can seek information or advice on crop selection, crop rotation, modern cropping technology, appropriate use of fertilizer, 
pesticide etc. 2takes a value of 1 if the farmers discussed or seek advice from the extension service provider on crop 
selection, crop rotation, modern cropping technology, appropriate use of fertilizer, pesticide etc. 
 
Table A6: Mean of Demographic and Farm Characteristics  
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Household Composition    
Female Headed household (dummy) 3,172 0.05 0.21 
Head with no education (dummy) 3,172 0.45 0.49 
Small farm size (1=cultivated land<50 decimal) 3,172 0.27 0.44 
Pure tenant farm households (1= no own land rice cultivation) 3,172 0.32 0.47 
Mixed tenant farms (1=cultivate own land as well as others land) 3,172 0.34 0.47 
Notes: Unit of observation: Household. Sample includes all rice producing farm households surveyed in 2014. 
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Figure B1: Distribution of BCUP Credit 
 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Distribution of Credit Amount 
(Treatment Assigned Households) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Credit Amount 
(Households who Actually Took Credit) 
 
 
Table B1: Impact of Access to Credit Access on Rice Production by Risk Preference 
 
Variables Dependent Variable:  Rice (in kilogram) 
  
Traditional 
Variety 
Traditional 
Variety 
 Hybrid 
and HYV 
Variety  
 Hybrid 
and HYV 
Variety  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit access (1=assigned in treatment group) -130.81 -122.87 716.74* 689.38* 
 (124.6 (113.13) (407.45) (406.96) 
Risk Averse1 11.94 14.43 -108.54 -118.07 
 (23.25 (21.06) (97.64) (87.54) 
Risk Averse * Credit Access 90.84** 85.23 -266.13 -203.72 
 (43.55 (41.31) (125.69) (112.87) 
Baseline Mean Rice Amount 324.14 324.14 1614.86 1614.86 
Baseline Covariates No Yes No  Yes 
Observations 2,792 2,792 2,792 2,792 
Notes: Unit of observation is household. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Rice in measured in kilogram (1 kilogram=2.204 
pounds). Standard error in parenthesis and are clustered at branch level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Risk aversion is gauged by individual’s 
choice over three different type of lottery with same probability of winning and losing. The first one offers low risk and comparatively low return, 
second lottery offers moderate risk and moderate return, and the third one offers higher benefit and higher risk. Choice of first, second, and the 
third lottery is assigned a value of 3, 2, and 1 respectively. 
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Table B2: Impact of Access to Credit on Borrowing from Different Sources 
 
Variables Dependent Variable: Amount of Borrowing (in taka) 
  Total  BCUP  
Bank and 
Cooperative 
Others NGO 
Informal 
Source 
Total Other 
than BCUP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Credit access 
(1=assigned in 
treatment group) 
6408.77* 5639.09*** 376.16 -284.2028 1336.713 769.68 
 (3270.21) (863.86) (973.01) (264.0737) (2415.71) (3481.96) 
Baseline Mean 4914.16 0.00 1487.56 379.71 1700.15 4914.16 
Observations 4,141 4,141 4,141 4,141 4,141 4,141 
Notes: Unit of observation is household. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Standard error in parenthesis and are clustered at 
branch level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Informal sources include friends and relatives, traditional moneylenders, landlords etc.   
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Table B3: Impact of Access to Credit on the Amount and Type of Land Used for Rice Production 
 
 
Variables Amon Season   Boro Season   Total 
  
Amount 
of land 
(decimals) 
Soil Type 
(1 if clay 
or clay-
loam) 
Land 
elevation 
(1 if 
medium to 
low land)   
Amount of 
land 
(decimals) 
Soil Type 
(1 if clay 
or clay-
loam) 
Land 
elevation 
(1 if 
medium to 
low land)   
Amount 
of land 
(decimals) 
Soil Type 
(1 if clay 
or clay-
loam) 
Land 
elevation 
(1 if 
medium to 
low land) 
  1 2 3   4 5 6   7 8 9 
Credit access (1=assigned  -4.23 0.22* -0.11  -7.24 0.01 -0.12  -4.31 0.03 -0.16* 
in treatment group) (8.69) (0.12) (0.08)  (8.79) (0.10) (0.07)  (15.19) (0.12) (0.09) 
                        
Baseline Mean 43.33 0.28 0.78   71.36 0.34 0.82   87.41 1700.15 4914.16 
Observations 2,769 2,779 2,779   3,278 3,282 3,282   3,857 4,107 4,107 
Notes: Unit of observation is household. Sample includes rice producing farm households. Standard error in parenthesis and are clustered at branch level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
